Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance

This article explores means by which non-governmental institutions and resources, both commercial and voluntay, may be enlisted in the interest of regulatory compliance. Following a discussion of non-governmental social control, it reviews the basic institutional forms of indirect governance through which third-party “co-production” of compliance might occur. It then discusses the basic issues which arise when certain public functions are delegated to or devolve upon private interests, and suggests safeguards which might be put in place to enhance the advantages and to minimize the adverse consequences of such devolution. The conclusion seeks to articulate basic principles for the mobilization of third parties in furtherance of compliance, and to encourage the idea of a more participative regulatoy process.     

Just the Ticket? The Labour Party's Deputy Leadership Election of 2007

Although there were six contenders for Labour's Deputy Leadership contest, it was conducted with remarkably little personal animosity. Nor, for the most part, were there substantive policy differences between the challengers, with the notable exception of the Iraq War. Instead, there was a clear determination to 'move on' from Blairism, and an acknowledgement that changes or new priorities were now necessary in key areas of policy, albeit without lurching to the Left or reviving 'Old Labour'. As such, the main differences between the candidates derived from their differing perceptions of the role of the Deputy Leader, and what they would each contribute to the post if elected. The ballot also revealed the manner in which support for the six contenders varied across the three sections of Labour's electoral college, so that each candidate tended to be more popular among one section of the Party, but enjoyed less support from the other two sections.     

Why do so many people vote 'unnaturally'? A cultural explanation for voting behaviour

Abstract. The traditional class approach to politics maintains that the working class 'naturally' votes for left-wing parties because they represent its economic interests. Such traditional voting patterns have, however, become less typical, giving rise to the 'Death of Class Debate' in political sociology. Against this background, using data collected in the Netherlands in 1997, this article examines why so many people, working and middle class alike, vote for parties that do not represent their 'real class interests'. Critically elaborating Lipset's work on working-class authoritarianism and Inglehart's on postmaterialism, the article confirms that 'natural' voting complies with the logic of class analysis. 'Unnatural' voting, however, is not driven by economic cues and class. Right-wing working-class voting behaviour is caused by cultural conservatism that stems from limited cultural capital. The pattern of voting for the two small leftist parties in Dutch politics underscores the significance of this cultural explanation: those with limited cultural capital and culturally conservative values vote for the Socialist Party ('Old Left') rather than the Greens ('New Left'). Breaking the traditional monopoly of the one-sided class approach and using a more eclectic and open theoretical approach enables political sociologists once again to appreciate the explanatory power of the class perspective.     

Sovereignty Negotiations and Gibraltar's Military Facilities: How Two “Red-Line” Issues Became Three

The Brussels Agreement signed between Britain and Spain in 1984 aimed to resolve all aspects of the dispute over Gibraltar, including sovereignty, which dated back to the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. Desultory progress was made in negotiations until 2001, when the British Government decided to attempt to negotiate a joint sovereignty agreement. From the outset two non-negotiable (‘red-line’) issues on Britain's part were established: the agreement must be permanent, and it must be subject to a referendum in Gibraltar. As the negotiations progressed, a third ‘red-line’ issue emerged: Britain insisted on retaining control of Gibraltar's military facilities. The article explores how this third issue emerged and the possible reasons why it did so following 9/11.     

The Coalition Programme: A New Vision for Britain or Politics as Usual?

The Coalition programme includes restructuring public provision through reforms and cuts which will take public spending in the Britain below that in the US. This article explores whether the Coalition agenda is best understood as a new approach to Britain's deep‐seated economic short‐comings or simply as the normal politics of gaining and retaining power. It analyses the current government's programme, identifies the common features across the range of policies and discusses how they are likely to develop as they encounter set‐backs.     

Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in the Danish parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda‐setting

Inspired by the agenda‐setting literature, this article outlines a model of issue competition focusing on the interaction between government and opposition parties through the party‐system agenda. Unlike previous studies of issue competition, the model makes it possible to answer questions such as why some parties have greater success than others in forcing other parties to address unpleasant issues. One of the central implications of the model is that opposition parties are freer to focus continually on issues that are advantageous to themselves, whereas government parties more often are forced to respond to issues brought up on the party‐system agenda. Using data on issue competition in Denmark covering 25 years and 23 issue categories, the issue competition model is evaluated and finds strong support in a set of cross‐sectional time‐series analyses.